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THE GRAND BARGAIN: REVITALIZING 
LABOR THROUGH NLRA REFORM AND 
RADICAL WORKPLACE RELATIONS 
MICHAEL M. OSWALT† 
ABSTRACT 
 Amid steadily declining union density, debate has taken center 
stage in the American labor movement regarding the potential—or 
even utility—of reforming the National Labor Relations Act to 
reverse the trend. This Note argues that such reform is possible, 
through a grand legislative bargain nationalizing the so-called right-
to-work regime in exchange for abolishing the NLRB election in 
favor of the card-check union certification procedure. Using legal, 
sociological, and radical democratic theory and examples, this Note 
demonstrates that, counterintuitively, the right-to-work environment 
can strengthen unions instead of weakening them. Both changes 
therefore benefit labor. 
INTRODUCTION 
The seventieth anniversary of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA)1 prompted renewed reflection on its ability to effectively 
govern relations between labor and management in the modern 
workplace.2 For supporters of the American labor movement, the 
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 1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 225–26 (2005) (“[I]n 2005, the seventieth anniversary of the enactment of 
the National Labor Relations Act[,] . . . the noble ideas of the NLRA seem quaint at best, 
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2005 occasion was not a cause for celebration.3 Although surveys 
showed that a majority of U.S. workers would vote for a union in 
their workplace if an election were held,4 by 2006 the percentage of 
private wage-earners in unions had shrunk to 7.4 percent,5 less than 
one-third the level reported in the early 1970s.6 That the statute 
valiantly proclaimed the protection of the right to self-organization to 
be the “policy of the United States”7 served only as a sardonic 
reminder of the gulf between the Act’s ideals and the everyday 
realities of union organizing.8 Some commentators called for various 
reforms of the Act,9 others for its repeal.10 Jonathan Hiatt, AFL-CIO 
 
perhaps irrelevant or even hostile to labor’s interest.”); Union, Management Attorneys Disagree 
on Significance of Recent NLRB Rulings, 103 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-1 (May 31, 2005) 
(reporting on the American Bar Association’s Section of Labor and Employment Law 
conference marking the seventieth year of the Act); Charles B. Craver, The National Labor 
Relations Act at Seventy: Rapidly Approaching Irrelevance, PERSP. ON WORK, Fall 2005, 
http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/Perspectives/onlinecompanion/Fall05-craver.htm (“The NLRA 
has not kept pace with changing economic and sociological conditions. . . . This is why the Act 
has become almost irrelevant to most employees.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Jack Rasmus, Reorganizing American Labor: A Reunification Proposal, Z 
MAG., July–Aug. 2006, at 66, 66, available at http://zmagsite.zmag.org/JulAug2006/rasmus0706. 
html (“At no time in the past 70 years have American workers and unions been under more 
direct and intense attack by corporate America. Moreover, that attack continues to show signs 
of becoming increasingly virulent and bold.”); Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act 
at Seventy: The Decline of Unionization and Collective Bargaining in America, PERSP. ON 
WORK, Fall 2005, http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/Perspectives/onlinecompanion/Fall05-getman. 
htm (“There is little reason to celebrate. The NLRA no longer serves . . . its founding 
principles. . . . [Seventy] years later, optimism has given way to cynicism and despair.”). 
 4. PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., LABOR DAY 2005: THE STATE OF WORKING 
AMERICA 6 (2005), available at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/laborday/upload/ld2005_report. 
pdf. 
 5. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members in 2006, at 1 (Jan. 25, 2007), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
 6. Eduardo Porter, Unions Pay Dearly for Success, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 3 
(Business), at 4. 
 7. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codified 
at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)). 
 8. Representative, first-person accounts of the perils involved in organizing a union are 
powerfully presented in MARY BETH MAXWELL & BRUCE NISSEN, AM. RIGHTS AT WORK, 
SOME OF THEM ARE BRAVE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 1–2 
(2003), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/ 
Some%20of%20them%20Are%20Brave.pdf. A comprehensive empirical discussion of the 
same phenomenon is outlined in CHIRAG MEHTA & NIK THEODORE, UNDERMINING THE 
RIGHT TO ORGANIZE: EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR DURING UNION REPRESENTATION CAMPAIGNS 
8–16 (2005), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/ 
UROCUEDcompressedfullreport.pdf. 
 9. E.g., Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We Fix 
It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 126–27, 138–46 (2003) (criticizing the Act and suggesting avenues for 
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general counsel, questioned “how much of the Act [would] be left” by 
its seventy-fifth anniversary, given the rate at which long-standing 
labor law doctrines had been undermined by the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) in just the previous twelve 
months.11 
Despite differences of opinion regarding traditional labor law’s 
potential to revive workplace democracy, the labor movement has 
largely coalesced around a legislative proposal to reform the NLRA: 
the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA).12 The AFL-CIO centers its 
congressional lobbying efforts around the EFCA, to which the AFL-
CIO website devotes significant attention and is the subject of 
aggressive petition, email, and organizational endorsement 
campaigns.13 
The EFCA is ambitious legislation. It would eliminate the 
traditional secret-ballot NLRB election in favor of certifying a union 
pursuant to a Board finding that a majority of employees have signed 
 
reform); Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 185–206 (2001) (setting out various possible amendments to make 
the Act more favorable to workers seeking to form a union); see also Dannin, supra note 2, at 
234–40 (proposing a novel litigation strategy to reinvigorate the enforcement powers of the 
NLRA). 
 10. E.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN, Will Labor Fare Better Under State Labor Relations 
Law?, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASSOCIATION SERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
58TH ANNUAL MEETING 125, 126 (2006) (contending that national labor law, including the 
NLRA, “has failed to give U.S. workers ways to obtain the labor representation and 
participation that they want” and advocating state regulation of labor relations); Anton G. 
Hajjar & Daniel B. Smith, National Labor Relations Board Interference with Private 
Representation Agreements—Is Repeal of the National Labor Relations Act the Answer? 24 
(May 13, 2004) (unpublished paper presented to the Pacific Coast Labor & Employment Law 
Conference, available at http://www.abanet.org/labor/newsletter/pp/fall06/hajjar.pdf) 
(considering the ramifications of repealing the Act). Calls to repeal the Act, even emanating 
from within the mainstream of the labor movement, were documented as long ago as the 1980s. 
See Cathy Trost & Leonard M. Apcar, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a ‘Dead Letter,’ 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8 (reporting AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland’s suggestion to 
repeal the NLRA). 
 11. Jonathan Hiatt, General Counsel, AFL-CIO, Address at the ABA Labor and 
Employment Law Conference: 70th Anniversary Celebration of the National Labor Relations 
Act (May 25, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/labor/newsletter/pp/summer05/ 
hiatt.html. 
 12. S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 13. AFL-CIO, The Employee Free Choice Act, http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/ 
voiceatwork/efca (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
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authorizations designating the union as its bargaining representative.14 
The EFCA would also provide for first-contract mediation and 
arbitration if an employer and a union were unable to reach a 
contract agreement within ninety days.15 And it would increase the 
penalties assessed to employers who commit unfair labor practices 
against employees during a union campaign or first-contract 
negotiation, including treble back pay, civil penalties, and a 
requirement that the NLRB seek a federal court injunction against an 
employer it finds has significantly interfered with employee rights 
during an organizing or first-contract campaign.16 
Nonetheless, many question if any NLRA reform proposal—
beneficial to the labor movement or not—is legislatively viable, 
regardless of which party controls the White House or Congress. In 
meticulously tracing the roots of what she terms the “ossification of 
labor law,”17 Professor Cynthia Estlund notes that “for many decades, 
both organized labor and especially employers have had enough 
support in Congress to block any significant amendment that either 
group strongly opposes.”18 The bar for “enough support” is rather 
low: “it means a minority that is big enough, well organized enough, 
and committed enough to tie up a bill through the arcane 
supermajority requirements of the Senate.”19 That labor law reform 
provokes such committed opposition leads Estlund somewhat 
drearily to conclude that labor’s best hope for change might be to 
 
 14. S. 1041 § 2 (proposing an amendment to section 9(c) of the NLRA); H.R. 800 § 2 
(proposing the same amendment). This proposed procedure is commonly known as “card-
check” or “majority sign-up.” See discussion infra Part I. 
 15. S. 1041 § 3 (proposing an amendment to section 8 of the NLRA); H.R. 800 § 3 
(proposing the same amendment). 
 16. S. 1041 § 4 (proposing amendments to sections 10(1), 10(c), and 12 of the NLRA); H.R. 
800 § 4 (proposing the same amendments). 
 17. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1527, 1532–44 (2002) (noting a longstanding political impasse has blocked any major 
congressional revision of the NLRA since 1959). 
 18. Id. at 1540. 
 19. Id. Indeed, although in the Democratic 110th Congress EFCA passed the House with a 
sizable majority, its supporters failed to overcome a Senate filibuster. Even so, President 
George W. Bush promised to veto the legislation, a move Congress probably would not have 
been able to override. See Steven Greenhouse, Clash Nears in the Senate on Legislation Helping 
Unions Organize, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at A16 (“The [EFCA] . . . fac[es] the threat of a 
veto by the Bush administration . . . .”); Steven Greenhouse, Senate Republicans Block Bill on 
Unionizing, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007, at A21 (“White House officials had vowed to veto the 
[EFCA].”). 
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rally public support for workers’ rights,20 eschewing legislative reform 
efforts altogether.21 
This Note suggests that major NLRA reform—reform calculated 
to vivify the labor movement through revitalized organizing and 
internal activism—is possible. A grand compromise between 
entrenched labor and management interests can indeed be reached, 
but only if the stakes are drastically raised. Labor must receive what 
is central to its strategy and rhetoric, and business must receive what 
is central to its anti-union, free-market ideology. The key is that the 
reform management believes would cripple the American labor 
movement is, in fact, vital to its survival. The “grand bargain” this 
Note proposes would amend the NLRA to abolish the secret-ballot 
union election in favor of a universal “card-check” procedure22 and 
would nationalize the so-called “right-to-work” regime in force in 
twenty-two states. Both changes, this Note demonstrates, are 
beneficial to labor. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of card-check’s benefits 
to workplace organizing efforts, showing why labor vigorously 
supports the procedure and management strenuously opposes it. Part 
II briefly traces the history of right-to-work, some conventional 
research attesting to its deleterious effects on unions, and how the 
legal gulf between the right-to-work and non-right-to-work models is 
less stark than is commonly presumed. Part III explores how some 
unions have defied conventional wisdom to achieve success in the 
right-to-work setting. Finally, Part IV uses legal, sociological, and 
political theory scholarship to argue that unions not only can survive 
in a right-to-work environment—they can thrive. The regime, 
counterintuitively, does not necessarily weaken unions—“right-to-
work” can strengthen them. 
 
 20. Estlund, supra note 17, at 1611. Unfortunately, Estlund may not have considered 
evidence of bias in the media’s coverage of the labor movement, which might negatively affect 
labor’s ability to shape public consciousness. See, e.g., Bradford Plumer, Production Values: 
Figuring out What’s Wrong with the Media’s Coverage of Organized Labor, Mother Jones, Sept. 
7, 2005, http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2005/09/laborcoverage.html (citing 
empirical research suggesting that media coverage of strikes focuses primarily on how 
consumers will be affected by the labor disputes). 
 21. Estlund, supra note 17, at 1611–12. 
 22. “Card-check” is a concept taken directly from the Employee Free Choice Act. See 
S.1041, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (proposing an amendment to section 9(c) of the NLRA); H.R. 
800, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (proposing the same amendment). 
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I.  CARD-CHECK IN UNION ORGANIZING 
The phrase “card-check” refers to a process in which an 
employer promises to recognize a union as the exclusive bargaining 
representative if a majority of workers in a unit sign cards supporting 
unionization.23 Sometimes a card-check pact couples with a more 
general “neutrality agreement” or arrangement crafted by the union 
to ease employer opposition during the organizing drive.24 For 
instance, a neutrality agreement might require that the employer not 
engage in certain speech or intimidation tactics while the union 
collects cards, or it might allow organizers greater access to the 
employer’s property.25 
That card-check agreements circumvent the traditional NLRB 
election does not detract from their legitimacy.26 Rather, consistent 
with aspirations in the National Labor Relations Act promoting 
workplace cooperation and harmony,27 courts have consistently held 
that employers may voluntarily contract to recognize a union by 
means other than an election, including a specified majority of signed 
authorization cards.28 Indeed, courts will enforce a signed and fully 
integrated card-check agreement against a recalcitrant employer.29 
 
 23. Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor 
Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 
383 (2001). 
 24. Id. at 377. 
 25. Id. at 380–85. The mere existence of a neutrality agreement does not foreclose the 
possibility of a traditional NLRB election. Like any contract, its content will vary by the parties’ 
intent, thus a union seeking to circumvent the Board would have to specifically negotiate a card-
check clause. See id. (discussing card-check as a negotiated alternative to an NLRB election, not 
as the default). 
 26. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596–97 (1969) (describing a card-check 
procedure as a valid means of designating a union as the exclusive bargaining representative). 
 27. See NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401–02 (1952) (“The National Labor 
Relations Act is designed to promote industrial peace by encouraging the making of voluntary 
agreements governing relations between unions and employers.”). 
 28. Card-check arrangements have been uniformly endorsed by the Board and courts. E.g., 
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150 v. NLRB, 361 F.3d 395, 399–400 (7th Cir. 2004); 
NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 751 (7th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Broadmoor 
Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238, 241–42 (9th Cir. 1978); MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 464, 
464, 466 (1999). 
 29. See, e.g., Hotel & Rest. Employees Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561, 
563, 568 (2d Cir. 1993) (enforcing card-check and neutrality agreements pursuant to section 301 
of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act); Snow, 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 710 (1961) 
(requiring an employer to honor the results of a card-check agreement), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 
(9th Cir. 1962). 
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In fact, card-check agreements have become the rule rather than 
the exception in organizing campaigns.30 In 2005, card-check was the 
genesis for more than 70 percent of newly unionized workers, 
compared to just 5 percent in the mid-1980s.31 
AFL-CIO lobbyist Andy Levin succinctly captured the rationale 
behind unions’ increasing reluctance to engage the formal NLRB 
election process: “The NLRB (election route) is a death trap.”32 
Though perhaps overstated, in representation elections overseen by 
the NLRB employers frequently and aggressively partake in both 
legal and nonlegal anti-union tactics. A report by the University of 
Illinois at Chicago’s Center for Urban Economic Development found 
that in the lead-up to 2002 NLRB elections, 51 percent of employers 
used bribery or favoritism to persuade workers to oppose the union,33 
49 percent threatened to close a worksite if the union prevailed,34 91 
percent required employees to attend anti-union meetings with 
supervisors,35 and 30 percent fired workers allied with the union.36 
In contrast, the card-check paradigm lessens the likelihood and 
opportunity for management to intimidate and coerce employees, 
especially when card-check combines with an employer-neutrality 
clause.37 As Stewart Acuff, the AFL-CIO’s organizing director 
explained: “We prefer card check because people can do it off 
premises, can do it in their homes, can do it without the employer 
looking over their shoulder.”38 Statistics support Acuff’s anecdotal 
experiences: 46 percent of workers involved in 2002 NLRB elections 
reported having experienced employer coercion leading up to the 
 
 30. See, e.g., David Wessel, Some Workers Gain with New Union Tactics, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
31, 2002, at A1 (“About 80% of the workers organized [by one international union] last year 
never cast a ballot, instead persuading employers to accept workers’ written declarations that 
they want a union.”). 
 31. Steven Greenhouse, Employers Sharply Criticize Shift in Unionizing Method to Card 
from Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A9. 
 32. George Raine, A High-Stakes Labor Card Game: Organizing Strategy Has Hotel 
Workers Avoid Secret Ballot, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2006, at D1 (quoting Andy Levin, of the 
AFL-CIO). 
 33. MEHTA & THEODORE, supra note 8, at 9 tbl.2. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 15 tbl.3. 
 36. Id. at 5. 
 37. Hartley, supra note 23, at 383 (“[U]nion organizing success improves quite dramatically 
when a neutrality agreement . . . combine[s] with a provision for card-check recognition.”). 
 38. Anya Sostek, Union: Yes or No? As State AFL-CIO Convention Comes to Pittsburgh, 
Unions, Employers Push for Changes to Voting Procedures, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 
4, 2006 (quoting Stewart Acuff, organizing director of the AFL-CIO). 
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vote, while only 23 percent of workers engaged in card-check 
campaigns reported that their supervisors pressured them not to sign 
authorization cards.39 In turn, unions are significantly more likely to 
prevail in card-check campaigns than in Board-sponsored elections.40 
Part of the proposal advanced in this Note would statutorily 
formalize card-check, removing it from its framework as an 
agreement between a union and employer. Tracking the language in 
the EFCA,41 once the Board finds that a majority of employees in a 
bargaining unit have signed cards designating the union as their 
bargaining representative, the Board would be required to certify the 
union, avoiding the traditional election. This aspect of the proposal 
benefits the labor movement. The next Part discusses a trade-off, 
nationalized “right-to-work,” which presumably benefits the business 
community. 
II.  UNION SECURITY AND THE RIGHT-TO-WORK REGIME 
Union security “refers to an agreement between an employer 
and a union under which an employee must either join the union or 
satisfy a financial obligation to the union as a condition of 
employment.”42 The ultimate form of such security, in which an 
employer agrees to hire only preexisting union members, was lawful 
 
 39. AM. RIGHTS AT WORK, FACT OVER FICTION: OPPOSITION TO CARD CHECK DOESN’T 
ADD UP 2 (2006), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ 
ARAWReports/IBFactOverFictFinal.pdf. 
 40. Sostek, supra note 38 (“Unions are successful a little more than half the time in formal 
NLRB elections, [versus] nearly 80 percent with card checks.”). 
 41. Section 2 of the EFCA proposes amending section 9(c) of the NLRA to read: 
[W]henever a petition shall have been filed by an employee or group of employees or 
any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a majority of 
employees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining wish to be 
represented by an individual or labor organization for such purposes, the Board shall 
investigate the petition. If the Board finds that a majority of the employees in a unit 
appropriate for bargaining has signed valid authorizations designating the individual 
or labor organization specified in the petition as their bargaining representative and 
that no other individual or labor organization is currently certified or recognized as 
the exclusive representative of any of the employees in the unit, the Board shall not 
direct an election but shall certify the individual or labor organization as the 
representative . . . . 
S. 1041, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); see also H.R. 800, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (proposing the same 
amendment). 
 42. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, LABOR UNION LAW AND 
REGULATION 423 n.1 (William W. Osborne, Jr. ed., 2003). 
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under section 8(3) of the NLRA until 1947,43 when Congress revised 
the Act through the Taft-Hartley amendments.44 Taft-Hartley 
emerged partly in response to increasing attacks that this powerful 
arrangement, known as the “closed shop,” discriminatorily barred 
free employment45 and threatened individual liberty.46 
But Congress also understood the union concern that Senator 
Robert Taft explained, “[I]f there is not a closed shop those not in the 
union will get a free ride [while] the union does the work get[ting] the 
wages raised.”47 Thus, section 8(a)(3) of the amended Act continued 
to sanction union-management partnerships that, in more limited 
forms, sought to provide union security so that employees who 
“shar[e] [in] the benefits of what unions are able to accomplish 
through collective bargaining . . . pay their share of the cost.”48 For 
instance, section 8(a)(3) allowed “union shop” agreements, under 
which nonunion members could obtain initial employment but had to 
become members within a certain period of time.49 
 
 43. Id. at 425 (“‘[N]othing in this [A]ct . . . shall preclude an employer from making an 
agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership 
therein . . . .’” (quoting the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935) 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000)))). 
 44. Id. at 427; see also Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch.120, sec. 101,  
§ 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140–41 (1947) (amending the NLRA). 
 45. See S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 6 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407, 412 (1948) (“[T]he closed shop . . . 
creates too great a barrier to free employment to be longer tolerated.”); ABA SECTION OF 
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 42, at 426 (describing congressional debates in which 
the closed-shop arrangements were seen as creating too high a barrier to trade to be tolerated). 
 46. The House Committee on Education and Labor stated rather hyperbolically that: 
For the last 14 years, . . . the American Workingman has been deprived of his 
dignity . . . . He has been cajoled, coerced, intimidated, and on many occasions beaten 
up, in the name of the splendid aims set forth in Section 1 of the National Labor 
Relations Act. His whole economic life has been subject to the complete domination 
and control of unregulated monopolists. 
H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 4 (1947), reprinted in NLRB, supra note 45, at 292, 295. 
 47. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 42, at 426 (quoting 93 
CONG. REC. 5089 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 45, at 1422); see also S. REP. NO. 80-
105, at 6 (1947), reprinted in NLRB, supra note 45, at 407, 413 (giving “employers and unions . . . 
the right to continue [union shop] arrangements” to “promote[] stability by eliminating ‘free 
riders’”). 
 48. S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 6 (1947), reprinted in NLRB, supra note 45, at 407, 412; accord 
NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740–41 (1963) (same). 
 49. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) 
(2000) (“[N]othing in this [Act] . . . shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with 
a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after 
the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment . . . .”). 
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In section 14(b), however, Congress allowed states to restrict or 
prohibit union security agreements altogether,50 carving out an 
exception to the NLRA’s default preemption rule.51 Twenty-two 
states have exercised this power, and their resulting statutes comprise 
what is colloquially known as the “right-to-work.”52 Although states 
differ in the extent to which they utilize 14(b) to restrict security 
agreements, in general, a right-to-work law “forbid[s] unions and 
employers from conditioning employment on any form of union 
‘membership,’ even if a majority of employees in the bargaining unit 
have selected the union as their exclusive bargaining 
representative.”53 In so doing, state right-to-work laws—either 
explicitly or as interpreted judicially—bar most union security 
agreements, including agency fee arrangements,54 which obligate 
nonmembers to pay the equivalent of union dues and fees for the 
union’s services.55 
Those allied with the labor movement vigorously oppose the 
right-to-work regime. At the state level, votes on right-to-work spur 
aggressive union countermobilizations56 that often recast the 
 
 50. See § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2000) (“Nothing in this [Act] shall be construed as 
authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor 
organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or 
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.”). The constitutionality of section 14(b) was 
upheld in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 531, 
537 (1949), and American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 540, 
542 (1949). 
 51. ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 42, at 516. 
 52. The following states have enacted “right-to-work” provisions: Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. app. G at 915–29. 
 53. Id. at 518. 
 54. Id. at 518 n.518 (“With the exception of seven states[,] . . . all of the right-to-work states 
expressly prohibit agreements conditioning employment on either membership or payment of 
dues or fees. In six of these states, either the courts or the Attorneys General have interpreted 
the right-to-work laws to prohibit agency shop arrangements.”). In Nevada, the seventh, the 
state Supreme Court has held that the state’s right-to-work law does not prohibit a union from 
charging nonmembers a fee in exchange for grievance representation. Cone v. Nev. Serv. 
Employees Local 1107, 998 P.2d 1178, 1181-82 (Nev. 2000). 
 55. See Amalgamated Ass’n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees, Div. 1225 v. Las 
Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line Inc., 319 F.2d 783, 784 (9th Cir. 1963) (“[An agency shop] 
agreement provides that employees who do not join the union will pay the regular initiation fee 
and dues to the union, and that if they do not make these payments, the employer will discharge 
them.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Posting of Mike Hall to AFL-CIO Now Blog, Working Families Celebrate 
Victory in New Hampshire, http://blog.aflcio.org/?p=303 (Mar. 23, 2006) (“On March 22, after a 
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legislation as the “right-to-work for less.”57 The modified moniker, in 
fact, references a phenomenon borne out by data. The average 
worker in a right-to-work state earns $5,333 less annually than 
workers in other states.58 Moreover, an analysis of Census Bureau 
statistics shows that both per capita income and union density 
negatively correlate at statistically significant levels with right-to-work 
laws.59 
Union hostility to right-to-work is not just a reaction to such 
points. At a very basic level, the right-to-work paradigm threatens a 
movement that owes its existence to its ability to collect dues from its 
members. In states where union security agreements can exist, the 
union shop and a steady stream of weekly or biweekly dues follow.60 
In contrast, where right-to-work reigns, the union shop is outlawed 
and free riders may flourish, enjoying the contractual benefits of 
union membership without actually paying for them. Indeed, as the 
 
working families’ mobilization plan that showed lawmakers just how deeply right to work laws 
go against the grain of New Hampshire voters, the latest RTW proposal again failed.”). 
 57. E.g., THE TRUTH ABOUT RIGHT TO WORK FOR LESS: RIGHT TO WORK HURTS 
EVERYONE, http://www.aflcio.org/issues/legislativealert/stateissues/upload/rtw.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2007). President Harry Truman said: “You will find some people saying that they are 
for the so-called right to work law, but they also believe in unions. This is absurd. . . . It is like 
saying you are for motherhood but against children.” See Open Shops in the 21st Century 
Workplace: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Education and the Workforce, 106th Cong. 3–4 (2000) (statement of Tim Roemer, Ranking 
Member, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the 
Workforce) (quoting President Truman). 
 58. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AVERAGE ANNUAL PAY 
BY STATE AND INDUSTRY, 2001, at tbl.1 (2002), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/ 
annpay.txt (calculated by author). 
 59. Raymond Hogler & Steven Shulman, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Right-to-
Work: Colorado’s Labor Peace Act and Its Implications for Public Policy, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
871, 928 & n.252 (1999). 
 60. There is, however, an intermediate step. Section 302(c)(4) of the NLRA sanctions an 
arrangement called “check-off,” where an employer will automatically deduct from an 
employee’s pay the dues owed to the union and transfer the dues directly to the union. ABA 
SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 42, at 530. Thus, while “union security” 
refers to an employer-union agreement to ensure workers pay dues as a condition of 
employment, “check-off” is a means of facilitating such payments. Id. at 531. Because the 
agreements are separate, a union may have a security agreement without check-off, or even 
check-off without union security. Id. Unions in non-right-to-work states will attempt to 
negotiate for both union security and check-off, ensuring a constant and efficient flow of dues to 
the union each pay period. Kenneth Bullock, Official Time as a Form of Union Security in 
Federal Sector Labor-Management Relations, 59 A.F.L. REV. 153, 160–61 (2007) (“Automatic 
dues check-off is a great boon to union officials, since it relieves them of the time-consuming 
duty of collecting dues while ensuring a steady stream of funds. Dues check-off appears in the 
overwhelming majority of private and public labor contracts . . . .”). 
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duty of fair representation61 is owed to all union-represented 
employees, including nonmembers, unions must expend resources 
advocating for individual nonmembers, but are prohibited from 
charging for those services.62 
Yet, even granting the unique budgetary constraints faced by 
unions in right-to-work states, labor’s troubles in such states63 cannot 
be blamed entirely on section 14(a). Given a number of judicial 
interpretations, union security is simply never complete, no matter 
the state. For example, even the vaunted “union shop” agreement, 
which ensures full membership, provides only partial security. The 
courts have interpreted “membership” narrowly, requiring employees 
to satisfy certain financial obligations to the union like basic dues and 
initiation fees, but not requiring them to join64 or support the union’s 
 
 61. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (“[T]he exclusive agent’s statutory authority to 
represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests 
of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with 
complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.”). 
 62. Judge Mikva of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit lamented this 
state of affairs: 
Fifty years ago . . . free riders simply benefitted from [union] accomplishments . . . 
such as higher wages or improved working conditions. Today, free riders can invoke 
union efforts on their particular behalf . . . and thus affirmatively deplete the union’s 
treasury. The difference is like that between the house guest who warms himself 
beside the fireplace, and the guest who demands that the thermostate [sic] be turned 
up. In short, the problem of free riders has become more pronounced as the 
responsibilities of unions have grown. 
  In the interest of “fair representation,” however, the NLRB has frustrated union 
efforts to recoup these costs from free riders. In Hughes Tool Co., 104 NLRB 318 
(1953), for example, the Board held that a union could not charge nonunion 
employees a flat rate for handling their grievances, or a graduated fee for handling 
arbitrations. 
Int’l Union of the United Ass’n of Journeymen Locals 141, 229, 681, and 706 v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 
1257, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Mikva, J., dissenting). But cf. Cone v. Nev. Serv. Employees 
Union/SEIU Local 1107, 998 P.2d 1178, 1181–82 (Nev. 2000) (holding that a union’s practice of 
“charging nonmembers fees for individual [grievance] representation” did not violate Nevada’s 
right-to-work laws because the state statute authorized nonunion members to act on their own 
behalf and pay for their own representation). 
 63. For 2005, the five states with the lowest levels of unionization were right-to-work states: 
Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. See Press Release, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, supra note 5, at 11 tbl.5. For a detailed history of labor’s decline and weakness 
in the right-to-work states, see generally Raymond Hogler, The Historical Misconception of 
Right to Work Laws in the United States: Senator Robert Wagner, Legal Policy, and the Decline 
of American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101 (2005). 
 64. See NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (“It is permissible to 
condition employment upon membership, but membership, insofar as it has significance to 
employment rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues. 
‘Membership’ as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core.”). 
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political efforts, external organizing ventures, or any other activities 
unrelated to “bargaining, contract administration, or grievance 
adjustment.”65 Thus, though the union shop assures a minimum 
financial infusion each month, dollars can fluctuate as members join 
or drop out, just like under the right-to-work regime. In turn, the 
union must still service its “members” to avoid apathy, stave off 
decertification efforts,66 and justify external organizing and political 
lobbying expenses.67 
Every union, in a right-to-work state or not, must therefore 
navigate economic trade-offs. A union in a right-to-work state must 
compensate for the possibility of a more precipitous drop in 
resources, but as that same union approaches the vigor of full 
membership, differences between it and a union in a non-right-to-
work state become almost wholly rhetorical.68 A strong union is a 
strong union in any state. 
In all, right-to-work laws surely affect unions’ fortunes in 
tangible ways. But to attribute labor’s difficulties in right-to-work 
states solely or even primarily to section 14(a) may be simplistic. 
III.  DEFYING ASSUMPTIONS IN THE RIGHT-TO-WORK SETTING 
This Note’s challenge is not to show that right-to-work’s negative 
impact on unions is overstated or does not really exist, but rather to 
demonstrate that, properly oriented, unions can prosper in a right-to-
work environment. Indeed, right-to-work can be beneficial. Because 
right-to-work is perceived to weaken unions and nicely complements 
business’s free-market schema, labor’s embrace of it could expose a 
rare space for legislative reform, allowing unions to secure the 
benefits of a national card-check procedure.69 This Part illustrates how 
unions can thrive in a right-to-work setting. 
 
 65. Commc’ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 738, 762–63 (1988). 
 66. Indeed, workers disgruntled with the union may petition for its decertification. 
National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000). 
 67. See Commc’ns Workers, 487 U.S. at 738, 762–63 (forbidding a union from spending 
mandatory agency fees on such expenses). 
 68. See, e.g., James W. Kuhn, Right-to-Work Laws—Symbols or Substance?, 14 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 587, 588 (1961) (“If all workers within a bargaining unit always sought 
membership and willingly paid their dues, right-to-work laws could have little significance for 
collective bargaining.”). 
 69. This proposal also has a certain inherent logic. Many would probably concede that in 
an ideal system of labor-management relations, those wanting union representation should be 
able to achieve that goal efficiently, whereas those who do not should not be forced to pay for it. 
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A. The Promise of Internal Activism 
Amid conspicuously low unionization rates in right-to-work 
states,70 some unions defy conventional wisdom71 and function well 
even in the absence of union security. Right-to-work Nevada boasts a 
relatively high unionization rate, equal to the rate in Pennsylvania, 
higher than the rate in Maryland, and a shade below the rate in 
Massachusetts—three states that allow for the union shop.72 Overall, 
Nevada’s unions represented 158,000 workers in 2005,73 92 percent of 
whom voluntarily maintained their union membership.74 In fact, 
Culinary Workers Local 226, the Las Vegas hotel local of UNITE 
HERE,75 is one of the largest and fastest-growing local unions in the 
United States, having doubled its membership since the 1980s even as 
hotel union membership declined nationally.76 United Electrical (UE) 
Local 1111, though located in non-right-to-work Wisconsin, chooses 
not to bargain for union security yet presently maintains 97 percent 
membership.77 
What accounts for such anomalies? The robustness of unions like 
Local 226 in Nevada and Local 1111 in Wisconsin could be a result of 
a conscious tendency towards internal activism, a trait some have 
suggested is critical to interior union strength. As labor journalist Abe 
Raskin opined, “[R]eorganizing the organized must transcend all 
 
 70. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 5, at 11 tbl.5 (listing 
unionization rates by state). 
 71. See, e.g., BARBARA S. GRIFFITH, THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN LABOR: OPERATION 
DIXIE AND THE DEFEAT OF THE CIO 171–73 (1988) (concluding that the failure of “Operation 
Dixie,” the CIO’s attempt to organize the southern right-to-work states en masse in the late 
1940s, was inevitable). 
 72. In 2005, 13.8 percent of Nevada’s workers were unionized, compared to 13.8 percent in 
Pennsylvania, 13.3 percent in Maryland, and 13.9 percent in Massachusetts. Press Release, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 5, at 11 tbl.5. 
 73. Id. 
 74. In 2005, 145,000 Nevada workers represented by unions voluntarily maintained their 
membership. Id. 
 75. UNITE HERE was formed in 2004 when the former Union of Needletrades, Industrial 
and Textile Employees (UNITE) merged with the former Hotel Employees and Restaurant 
Employees International Union (HERE). See UNITE HERE!, What is UNITE HERE?, http:// 
www.unitehere.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2007). 
 76. Harold Meyerson, Las Vegas as a Workers’ Paradise, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2004, at 
38; Anastasia H. Prokos, Employment and Labor Relations in Nevada, SOCIAL HEALTH OF 
NEVADA (2004), available at http://www.unlv.edu/centers/cdclv/healthnv/labor.html. 
 77. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America (UE) Local 1111, Who We 
Are, http://www.ue1111.org/whoweare.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2007). 
03__OSWALT.DOC 12/20/2007  10:10:53 AM 
2007] LABOR RELATIONS 705 
other union priorities if those now inside but divorced from any sense 
of genuine involvement are to become bona fide trade unionists.”78 
Indeed, Local 226’s resurgence79 coincided with the arrival of 
UNITE HERE’s President John Wilhelm, who had orchestrated a 
successful union drive at Yale University using a novel approach—
allowing the workers to act as organizers.80 Wilhelm brought this 
model to Las Vegas, instituting workers’ committees empowered to 
organize street rallies and union events without major interference 
from paid staff.81 With a new sense of purpose, the committees turned 
militant, culminating with a strike at the Horseshoe casino in 1989 
that led to hundreds of arrests.82 In preparation for the 2002 contract 
negotiations, the committees organized a rally attended by over 
twenty-three thousand local members at a Las Vegas sports arena.83 
Local 1111, for its part, attributes high membership rates to a 
“constant shop-floor presence . . . on the lookout for young workers 
willing to stand up to management . . . send[ing] them to its shop 
steward training program to develop their ability to be an effective 
voice for their co-workers.”84 Journalist Tom Wetzel, who has 
conducted hundreds of interviews with union workers in the right-to-
work state of Iowa, reported that peer pressure on the shop floor 
buoys strong union membership: “If a worker refused to join the 
union, co-workers would refuse to lend him or her [tools] or do other 
favors that make life on the job more bearable. The attitude was: ‘If 
you won’t support us, you’re on your own, Jack. But if you do support 
us, we’ll watch your back.’”85 
 
 78. A.H. Raskin, New Directions for the AFL-CIO, NEW MGMT., Winter 1986, at 11, 12–
13. 
 79. During the 1980s, workers at six hotels decertified from the union, and the union’s 
health-care plan approached bankruptcy. Meyerson, supra note 76, at 39. 
 80. See id. at 39–40 (describing the beginning of the union’s reconstruction under 
Wilhelm). 
 81. See id. at 40 (extolling Wilhelm’s formation of “a new kind of union” based on workers’ 
committees). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Tom Wetzel, Unionism and Workers’ Liberation, Z MAG., May 31, 2006, http://www. 
zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?itemID=10351. 
 85. Id. 
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B. Business Unionism and Its Evolution 
Because certain unions have found some success in the right-to-
work environment using tactics some theorize should indeed be 
helpful does not mean that the experiences of, for example, Local 226 
can be replicated nationally, or even anywhere else. In fact, so-called 
“labor realists” disparage attempts at internal organizing as circular 
efforts that merely reactivate the already activated.86 Members, the 
“realists” have argued, receive the quality of unionism they demand, 
and little can be done to alter their levels of involvement.87 
Such thinking may have helped to usher in the era of “business 
unionism” in the 1970s and 1980s, under which unions hoped to parry 
business animus and reverse shrinking rolls88 by adopting less activist 
and more conciliatory postures.89 Unions crafted the approach both to 
ease management opposition to labor law reform and to convince 
employers that increased productivity and efficiency could best be 
achieved through cooperation with labor.90 
The strategy failed.91 Rather than join with unions, employers 
simply avoided them, a choice that seemed to guarantee higher 
profits without the inconvenience of partnership.92 In response, 
instead of reversing course, many unions quixotically adopted an even 
less activist stance—muting external organizing efforts,93 discouraging 
rank-and-file activism in existing unions, and fostering workers’ 
 
 86. ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, ROBUST UNIONISM 101–09 (1991). 
 87. Id. at 101. 
 88. In 1972, then AFL-CIO president George Meany astonishingly remarked: “Why should 
we worry about organizing. . . . Frankly, I used to worry about the membership, about the size of 
the membership. But quite a few years ago, I just stopped worrying about it, because to me, it 
doesn’t make any difference.” RICK FANTASIA & KIM VOSS, HARD WORK 125 (2004). 
 89. Professor Ian Robinson described the strategy this way: “[U]nions would downplay 
their adversarial traditions, and become partners in the intensifying international competitive 
struggle. Labor’s contribution to this partnership would be greater flexibility in workplace 
organization, and the encouragement of productivity-enhancing employee ‘voice.’” Ian 
Robinson, Neoliberal Restructuring and U.S. Unions: Toward Social Movement Unionism?, 26 
CRITICAL SOC. 109, 127 (2000). 
 90. STEVEN H. LOPEZ, REORGANIZING THE RUST BELT 4 (2004). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 5. 
 93. The United Auto Workers, for example, shunned new, nonunion auto parts 
contractors, and local officials of the United Food and Commercial Workers reshaped their 
jurisdictional boundaries so that they could discontinue organizing department stores. 
FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 88, at 125. 
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dependence on paid union staff.94 Workers, in turn, began to view 
unions as a service they might consider purchasing, as opposed to a 
collective movement they might join.95 
But as sociologists observed that organized labor had become 
more like an institutionalized interest group than a movement, some 
unions began to change.96 Shifting away from the failed values of 
business unionism, activists sought to transform the goals and tactics 
of organizing, as well as the roles of current union members.97 
Campaigns would treat unions not as a commodity to be sold, but as a 
vehicle for solidarity in service to collective action in the workplace 
and in society.98 This change would require radically new levels of 
commitment, courage, and participation by current members, who 
needed schooling in methods of direct action and remolding in the 
ethics of community mindedness and movement politics.99 Dubbed 
“social movement unionism,” the new philosophy would also rely on 
“corporate” or “comprehensive” campaigns, which try to turn a 
company’s social network of customers, investors, board members, 
and even religious allies against it by unearthing and publicizing 
embarrassing or hypocritical corporate facts and practices.100 Social 
movement unionism additionally would attempt to expand the arena 
of conflict into the greater community and society, often linking an 
organizing campaign at a particular firm to a social justice issue 
generally.101 Emphasizing surprising, creative, and multiple tactics, the 
experimentalism fostered by social movement unionism sparked the 
 
 94. LOPEZ, supra note, 90 at 59. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Kim Voss & Rachel Sherman, Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union 
Revitalization in the American Labor Movement, 106 AM. J. OF SOC. 303, 304 (2000) (discussing 
the “revitalization” of unions, specifically in the ways they have “begun to organize new 
members, using a wide variety of confrontation tactics, including massive street demonstrations, 
direct action, worker mobilization, sophisticated corporate campaigns, and circumvention of the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election process”). 
 97. Id. at 312–13. 
 98. FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 88, at 127. 
 99. Id. at 127–28. 
 100. Id. at 128–29. 
 101. Id. at 128, 131. 
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card-check innovation.102 Comprehensive campaigns remain 
ubiquitously coupled with demands for card-check agreements.103 
The Service Employees International Union’s (SEIU) Justice for 
Janitors (J for J) campaign in Los Angeles is probably the 
paradigmatic example of social movement unionism.104 Combining 
shrewd corporate research,105 the media, and escalating guerilla tactics 
ranging from health and safety inspections to street theater and 
outright trespass,106 J for J showcased a torrent of public support and 
collective activism unseen since the 1930s.107 In just two years, J for J 
helped 90 percent of Los Angeles’s high-rise janitors gain the wages 
and benefits of a collectively bargained agreement.108 Perhaps J for J’s 
greatest accomplishment, however, was in allowing an unprecedented 
level of activism by the janitors themselves. As summarized by 
sociologists Rick Fantasia and Kim Voss: 
[T]he campaign uncovered unexpected levels of solidarity and 
daring on the part of Los Angeles’s immigrant janitors. Far from 
being the docile wage slaves that many union officials predicted and 
that employers smugly expected, immigrant janitors proved to be 
quite militant, capable of quickly marshalling support not only 
among their fellow janitors but also among family, friends, and 
neighbors. Everyone, from employer-side lawyers to old-guard 
officials to the J for J staff, was astonished at these workers’ 
 
 102. See id. at 129 (“[S]ocial movement unionism is able and willing to look beyond the 
traditional and routinized form of labor recognition relied on for so long by U.S. unions, the 
formal NLRB election. Using either political pressure or a corporate campaign, or both, social 
movement unionism is prepared to push for . . . ‘card-check recognition’ . . . .”). 
 103. See id. (“As part of this more militant strategy, unions often ask community or religious 
leaders to certify the card count.”). 
 104. Id. at 134. 
 105. SEIU initially hired a full-time researcher assigned the sole task of uncovering the 
ownership and management architecture of Los Angeles commercial cleaning companies. Later 
projects revealed that the salient industry power brokers were not small subcontractors, but 
large international corporations, which were much more vulnerable to public opinion and social 
disruption. Id. at 139–40. 
 106. As portrayed in the movie Bread and Roses starring Adrien Brody and directed by Ken 
Loach, janitors cleaned a mock office in the middle of rush hour, shutting down traffic. BREAD 
AND ROSES (Alta Films S.A. 2000). The J for J campaign also engaged in “shaming rituals,” for 
instance, crashing high-level business meetings, chanting loudly, and throwing bags of trash 
around the room. FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 88, at 142. 
 107. FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 88, at 144. 
 108. Id. 
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willingness to overtake the paid J for J staff members in their 
intensity and commitment.109 
Fresh from J for J and other similarly successful campaigns, 
SEIU quickly grew dissatisfied by the AFL-CIO’s lack of financial 
and strategic commitment to new organizing ventures.110 SEIU and 
seven other unions formed a new federation called “Change to Win,” 
which the unions claimed would embody an even more aggressive and 
worker-fueled approach to organizing.111 
C. Social Movement Unionism: Implications for the Right-to-Work 
Setting 
The advent of Change to Win, the massive import placed on 
card-check agreements,112 and the demonstrated success of social 
movement unionism113 might portend a turning point in American 
labor organizing. The retreat from the conciliatory, professionalized 
ethic of business unionism may be complete, while the shift towards 
the creative, adversarial, and amateurized philosophy of social 
movement unionism may be total.114 
This possible crux in labor organization has crucial implications 
for unions’ ability to survive in the right-to-work environment. 
Stemming from social theorist Erving Goffman’s hypothesis that the 
levels and forms of participation in organizational structures can 
 
 109. Id. at 144–45. 
 110. Steven Greenhouse, Five Unions to Create a Coalition on Growth, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 
2005, at A12. 
 111. Steven Greenhouse, Breakaway Unions Start a New Federation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 
2005, at A17. 
 112. The agreements themselves are often achieved through the threat or use of a 
comprehensive campaign. See David Moberg, Paradigm Shift, IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 2006, at 41, 
42 (recognizing law Professor James Brudney’s argument that “unions are changing the model 
for winning recognition . . . by using direct action to gain employer neutrality and card check 
rights”). 
 113. See, e.g., Robert Bussel, Southern Organizing in the Post-Civil Rights Era: The Case of 
S. Lichtenberg, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 528, 535 (1999) (discussing how the use of 
comprehensive campaign tactics, including gathering support of the local faith community, 
training workers to use collective power, and broadening the campaign to encompass issues of 
gender inequality led to the union’s victory after two earlier campaigns, which did not utilize 
such a comprehensive strategy, were defeated); Paul Jarley & Cheryl L. Maranto, Union 
Corporate Campaigns: An Assessment, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 505, 519 (1990) (discussing 
how corporate campaign tactics present a serious new challenge to employers). 
 114. See generally BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE: 
A LABOR PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN BUSINESS (1992) (noting a trend in the labor movement 
pushing unions to become more participatory with respect to their members). 
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instigate or hinder levels of activism in other organizations later on,115 
sociology Professor Linda Markowitz has studied how organizing 
strategies influence workers after campaigns end.116 Markowitz closely 
followed two successful organizing campaigns.117 One, at Bob’s 
Grocery Stores, relied primarily on paid union staff to stage the 
campaign, while the other, at Geofelt Manufacturing, trained workers 
in organizing techniques and encouraged their participation in the 
drive.118 Both campaigns sharply restricted worker participation in the 
protracted contract negotiations that followed.119 
Workers at Bob’s reported feelings of dissatisfaction with the 
union and generalized helplessness during the talks.120 Lacking the 
experiences and training that might have been assimilated through 
active organizing, the workers foundered, trading agency for 
marginalization by failing to learn about their rights and neglecting 
opportunities to push for change within the union or company.121 Half 
reasoned against participation by anemically asserting that “activism 
was not part of their role as a ‘union member.’”122 Explained one 
worker: “I don’t need to become involved. We pay people to do 
that. . . . If they’re doing their jobs, I shouldn’t have to participate.”123 
Workers at Geofelt were similarly frustrated that the union had 
excluded them from contract talks, but responded quite differently.124 
Five workers who had been extremely active in the organizing 
campaign formed an informal committee to persuade co-workers that 
the union was “untrustworthy” and had abandoned them.125 The 
committee decided to try to replace the union with a rival, going so 
far as to research the official decertification process with the NLRB.126 
 
 115. See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF 
EXPERIENCE 22 (1974) (describing the way in which experiences provide “frameworks” which 
the actor then uses to view future events). 
 116. See LINDA MARKOWITZ, WORKER ACTIVISM AFTER SUCCESSFUL UNION 
ORGANIZING 83 (2000) (noting Goffman’s claim that organizational structures differently 
impact individuals’ responses to those organizations). 
 117. Id. at 12. 
 118. Id. at 105. 
 119. Id. at 131. 
 120. Id. at 152. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 152–53. 
 124. Id. at 157. 
 125. Id. at 157–58. 
 126. Id. at 158. 
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Markowitz stresses that “what is notable is that the action these 
employees took to redress their dissatisfaction imitated the action 
they had engaged in to create a union. Because they had learned only 
the specific skills associated with conducting an organizing drive, they 
began another organizing campaign to replace the union.”127 That is, 
workers used the skills they had been taught. 
Markowitz’s research would seem to refute the labor realist 
perspective, which holds that levels of union member activism are 
indigenous and immune to manipulation. Instead, in workers’ minds, 
the meanings and expectations of union membership perhaps evolve 
through experience.128 If so, the activism and collective spirit of 
Nevada’s Local 226 is not anomalous and could be replicated 
elsewhere. The burgeoning social justice unionism model exemplified 
by J for J is not just an effective campaign strategy but a blueprint for 
union strength in the postcontract period. And innovators like 
Jennifer Gordon, whose “Workplace Project” conditions legal 
services on participation in organizing activities,129 are shaping a 
consciousness that could undergird a new brand of internal unionism. 
In short, unions can survive in the right-to-work setting. Some already 
do. Social movement unionism primes a new generation of union 
members to embody the activist spirit essential to union life in a post–
union security world. 
IV.  THE UNION BENEFITS OF RIGHT-TO-WORK 
Having suggested that the presence of a vibrant membership 
undermines the conventional presumption that right-to-work 
necessarily saps union strength, this Note shows that the right-to-
work setting can actually benefit the labor movement. 
A. Suppressed Activism and the Core of the Union Shop 
Labor’s allies have not always viewed union security agreements 
as desirable to the movement. Samuel Gompers, founder of the 
American Federation of Labor, once said that “the workers in 
America adhere to voluntary institutions in preference to compulsory 
systems which are not only impractical but a menace to their welfare 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. at 176 (“Through the process of organizing, workers develop frameworks that 
set the stage for future interactions between the union and the workforce.”). 
 129. JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS 198 (2005). 
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and their liberty.”130 And even the most ardent unionist might secretly 
concede attorney Selwyn Torff’s observation that “there is something 
disquieting about any organization that demands that the law give it 
the right to compel where it has failed to persuade.”131 
The few who believe that labor would be strengthened by 
abandoning union security argue that the agreements foster a 
detached leadership out of touch with the membership. This is U.S. 
Representative Bob Goodlatte’s view: “[U]nions are alive and well in 
right-to-work states, but there is a very significant difference that I 
argue improves the unions. . . . [If] members aren’t satisfied, they can 
vote with their feet and walk away. . . . [I]t makes the leadership of 
the union more responsive to the members.”132 
Indeed, simple logic suggests that when dues are guaranteed, 
attentive member servicing may not be,133 cultivating a frustrated and 
apathetic rank and file. The right-to-work environment, alternatively, 
stands in sharp contrast. When dues are linked to member 
satisfaction, leadership’s responsiveness embodies a special urgency,134 
as intimated by Representative Goodlatte. In fact, labor historian 
Nelson Litchenstein describes 1930s unionism, which lacked union 
security entirely, as bustling with internal activism: “Everyday, local 
leaders faced the task of justifying the union’s existence to the rank 
and file to retain their loyalty . . . . Grievance battles were the order 
of the day, and local officers went about their jobs in an aggressive 
and energetic manner.”135 From the individual member’s perspective, 
this servicing incentive might be viewed as an advantage of the right-
to-work regime. From the union’s perspective, it might not be. 
 
 130. Open Shops in the 21st Century Workplace: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Education and the Workforce, supra note 57 
(statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte of Virginia (quoting Samuel Gompers)); see, e.g., Lawrence 
W. Reed, Labor Freedom Makes Sense, IDEAS ON LIBERTY, Feb. 2003, at 14, 15 (discussing the 
negative economic consequences of compulsory unionism). 
 131. Selwyn H. Torff, The Case for Voluntary Union Membership, 40 IOWA L. REV. 621, 626 
(1955). 
 132. Open Shops in the 21st Century Workplace: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Education and the Workforce, supra note 57 
(statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte). 
 133. See PAUL SULTAN, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: A STUDY IN CONFLICT 123 (1958) 
(“Under compulsory union provisions, leadership becomes further entrenched and increasingly 
indifferent to the wishes of the rank and file.”). 
 134. See id. at 122 (“[T]he employee must be allowed some effective device for showing his 
disapproval of union policies. The only effective way . . . is to withhold financial support from 
the union . . . .”). 
 135. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR’S WAR AT HOME 22 (2003). 
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The union might be wrong. Servicing indeed imposes 
administrative costs and burdens, which may be higher in right-to-
work states as unions try to enhance worker satisfaction and minimize 
free-riding. Such added costs are often cited as evidence that the 
right-to-work model hurts unions.136 The member servicing and 
interactions spurred by right-to-work could also be viewed as 
opportunities, however, and here radical democratic theory proves 
instructive. 
B. The Radical Opportunities of Member Servicing 
Political theorists have long identified a progressive atrophy in 
Americans’ civic and political engagement.137 According to Princeton 
theorist Jeffrey Stout, if the rise of such arms-length democracy has 
an antidote, it is embedded in the honesty of a decentralized, face-to-
face conversation. Indeed, for Stout, democratic activism resides in 
the “continuing social process of holding one another responsible . . . . 
The democratic practice of giving and asking for ethical reasons . . . is 
where the life of democracy principally resides.”138 In Stout’s terms, a 
political culture that restricts democratic practice to passive 
acceptance of shallow sound bites and a trip to the voting booth every 
two to four years breeds detachment and apathy—while scattered, 
impromptu, informal, reasoned conversations energize civic activity: 
The social practices that matter most directly to democracy, as I 
have argued at length, are the discursive practices of ethical 
deliberation and political debate. The discursive exchange essential 
to democracy is likely to thrive only where individuals identify to 
some significant extent with a community of reason-givers. At the 
local level, this may be the community constituted by arguments 
over who does the dishes, what to do with the garbage we produce, 
 
 136. See, e.g., AFL-CIO, Right to Work for Less, http://www.aflcio.org/issues/ 
legislativealert/stateissues/work/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2007) (“[R]ight to work laws just aren’t 
fair to dues-paying members. If a nonunion worker is fired illegally, the union must use its time 
and money to defend him or her, even if that requires going through a costly legal process. 
Everyone benefits, so all should share in the process.”). 
 137. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNUM, BOWLING ALONE 46 (2000) (“[S]ince the mid-1960s, the 
weight of the evidence suggests, despite the rapid rise in levels of education Americans have 
become . . . roughly 40 percent less engaged in party politics and indeed in political and civic 
organizations of all sorts.”). In a modern context, DeTocqueville’s observation that American 
democracy produces “an all-pervading and restless activity, a superabundant force,” SULTAN, 
supra note 133, at 112 (quoting DeTocqueville), seems rather quaint. 
 138. JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 6 (2004). 
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how the police are behaving, and what should be covered in a high 
school curriculum.139 
Thus, for Stout the true democratic activist is marked less by an 
interest in cable news and more by habits, dispositions, and practices 
that tend toward close relations with others, are spread neighbor to 
neighbor, and are imbued by an immediate culture that questions 
reality and demands explanation—even if the question is why is it 
always my turn to pick up the kids.140 
Stout’s prescription for civic engagement is familiar to those 
experienced in community organizing, where face-to-face encounters 
form the foundation for collective action and power. Indeed, Edward 
Chambers, executive director of the Industrial Areas Foundation 
(IAF), one of the most prominent community-organizing networks in 
the nation,141 has called the “relational meeting” the “most radical 
thing [we] do.”142 In IAF parlance, “relational meeting” is a technical 
term for building relationships, which leads to issue targets and the 
identification of indigenous leaders.143 Before an IAF organization 
even formally exists, organizers and initial leaders conduct up to ten 
thousand of such meetings over three to four years.144 A skilled 
organizer uses a relational meeting not to sell or push an issue, but to 
listen and ask short succinct questions in hopes of eliciting anecdotes 
and personal narratives, which reveal the underpinnings of one’s 
motivation or lack of motivation.145 Chambers explains: 
The relational meeting is the entry point to public life. . . . 
 . . . [It] isn’t chitchat, like the usual informal exchange over coffee 
or drinks. In casual meetings, we take people as they present 
themselves. We don’t push. We don’t dig. We don’t ask why or 
where a notion came from. We don’t probe an idea. We don’t raise 
possibilities. We don’t ask questions that engage the imagination: 
 
 139. Id. at 293 (footnote omitted). 
 140. See id. at 302 (“[W]hat we have going for us as a community[] are valued social 
practices and the forms of excellence they involve. We care about soccer, about how the pizzas 
and tortillas are made, and about having our voices heard in town hall. We want to hold each 
other responsible for commitments and actions, so we talk about them. We debate the merits of 
center forwards, anchovies, and school board candidates.”). 
 141. MARK R. WARREN, DRY BONES RATTLING 6–9 (2001). 
 142. EDWARD T. CHAMBERS, ROOTS FOR RADICALS 13 (2006). 
 143. Id. at 46, 49. 
 144. Id. at 48. 
 145. Id. at 50–51. 
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“Well, what if you looked at it this way?” “How would your parents 
have reacted?” “How would you feel if you were the other 
person?” . . . . 
 The relational meeting . . . is an attempt to find the other’s center. 
 . . . Stories like these don’t rest on the surface, to be picked up in 
casual chatter. Only concerted and intentional encounters will bring 
them to light.146 
Mark Warren, an anthropologist who has studied the IAF 
method extensively, concludes that relational meetings work for IAF 
because “[i]t is in community connections that individuals can 
develop the will to act collectively.”147 Moreover, “[w]hen people are 
placed in interdependent situations where they believe that they need 
each other, they forego initial prejudices and enact cross-ethnic and 
cross-racial helping.”148 The “challenge,” he argues, “is to create these 
interdependent and cooperative forms.”149 
The American workplace is well suited to Warren’s challenge 
because such an interdependent cooperative form already exists: the 
labor union. The acute goal, then, is to reorient labor to use IAF-type 
relational tactics internally, which political theory suggests and 
community organizing shows can incite individuals’ mobilization and 
create opportunities for collective action. In short, unions must be 
transformed into what Stout terms a “community of reason-givers,”150 
with members and officials discussing internal union matters honestly, 
seriously, and often. 
The rise of social movement unionism, in combination with 
Professor Markowitz’s research,151 suggests that the newest generation 
of union members may be especially receptive to internal relational 
tactics. But member receptivity may not be enough. Union officials 
may need to be compelled to initiate relational contact in the vein of 
radical democratic theory and IAF practice. 
Nationalized right-to-work might obligate just such a 
commitment. Right-to-work at a national level, when viewed not as a 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. WARREN, supra note 141, at 23. 
 148. Id. at 27. 
 149. Id. 
 150. STOUT, supra note 138, at 293. 
 151. See supra notes 116–28 and accompanying text. 
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demoralizing drain on resources but as an opportunity for relation 
renewal, could drastically reframe the consciousness of union officials 
and the implicit expectations of union membership. The tactics used 
and the culture shaped by Las Vegas’s Local 226 and UE Local 1111 
would no longer be anomalous, but the rule. National right-to-work 
would institutionalize interior relation building, which would 
institutionalize interior activism, which would, in turn, institutionalize 
stronger unions.152 
C. UPS Teamsters 
The union culture at United Parcel Service (UPS) exemplifies 
this progression. UPS is a large global company with a unionized 
workforce that spans right-to-work and union security states alike.153 
As public policy professor Robert Putnam, who has studied UPS’s 
employee culture, observes, “UPS exemplifies relational work.”154 
Putnam’s word choice is deliberate. “Relational work” is a technical 
reference to IAF organizing philosophy.155 Indeed, Putnam compares 
UPS union practices to the community-organizing techniques 
 
 152. This Note does not suggest that right-to-work laws embody some intangible power that 
morphs the interactions of union members and officials. There are many unions in right-to-work 
states that are weak, dysfunctional and hobbled by noncontributing free-riders. See, e.g., 
Catherine Meeker, Defining “Ministerial Aid”: Union Decertification Under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1001–02 (1999) (“[O]ver the last four decades, employees 
have used union decertification petitions with increasing frequency and success.” (footnote 
omitted)). These unions probably do poor relational work, have been largely abandoned by the 
national labor movement, and the presence of right-to-work does little to provoke a change in 
their tactics. What this Note does posit is that if right-to-work were extended nationally, labor as 
a whole would have the utmost incentive to overhaul its internal strategies in a universal and 
intentional manner. The most likely and effective strategic shift, it is argued, would be reform in 
the vein of IAF practice and radical democratic theory. The widespread acceptance of social 
movement unionism as an organizing model would make this shift easier than at any time in 
history. See, e.g., FANTASIA & VOSS, supra note 88, at 131 (“[T]he vision of labor evoked by 
social movement unionism is entirely different than the one conjured up by business 
unionism . . . . [I]t allows organizers to evoke a new vision of unionism . . . .”). This would 
require extreme tactical changes and perhaps large training costs. But some unions have already 
implemented IAF-type internal strategies successfully in the right-to-work environment. See 
discussion supra Part III.A. They are thriving. That may—in part—be attributable to member 
servicing and activism pressures exerted by right-to-work itself. Ultimately, this Note speculates 
that the long-term benefits of hundreds of newly responsive unions and millions of newly 
activist and radicalized unionists would outweigh the short-term costs of internal union reform. 
 153. UPS has 370,000 employees world-wide. The company’s drivers and package sorters 
and loaders are unionized at its various hubs and commercial locations. ROBERT D. PUTNUM & 
LEWIS M. FELDSTONE, BETTER TOGETHER 210–11 (2003). 
 154. Id. at 212. 
 155. See supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text. 
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employed successfully by Valley Interfaith, the IAF affiliate in 
southern Texas.156 Indeed, UPS Teamsters expect and institutionalize 
face-to-face conversation: 
Every morning, in every UPS hub and center, drivers gather for a 
brief prework communication meeting, or PCM, before they go out 
on the road. Every day, all around the country, drivers meet at 
lunchtime in parks and parking lots to talk, mixing social 
conversation with work: veterans help newcomers find obscure 
addresses or solve other problems; the drivers exchange missorted 
packages or balance their remaining loads to make sure everything 
gets delivered on time. . . . 
A lot of conversation takes the form of storytelling. . . . Veteran 
drivers recount tales of their early difficulties to encourage 
newcomers and to communicate some of the tricks of the trade. 
They also recall the veterans who shared stories with them when 
they were new: the tales, for instance, of winter deliveries in rural 
Wisconsin that includes tips for preventing ice from forming on the 
steering wheel and how you are likely to find your farmer-customers 
at different places, depending on the weather.157 
Such relational work has led to what Putnam describes as an 
almost unprecedented culture of internal cohesion: “Tales of 
cooperation are part of the company’s folklore. . . . [T]he brown 
uniform worn by every driver represents membership in a collective 
enterprise, commonality over individuality.”158 In turn, as IAF 
philosophy and radical democratic theory predict, internal relation 
building has catalyzed external and internal activism at UPS. Putnam 
quotes Linda Kaboolian, a labor relations expert specializing in the 
history of the Teamsters: “[E]mployee groups and union locals are 
very active in civic life—there is a real occupational community 
among UPS workers. Historically, there has been more union 
democracy and less corruption in UPS locals than in other parts of the 
Teamsters.”159 
The 1997 national UPS Teamsters strike epitomized how internal 
relation building, sparking activism, can translate into union strength. 
The catalyst for the strike itself was a testament to the unity and 
 
 156. PUTNUM & FELDSTONE, supra note 153, at 212. 
 157. Id. at 212–13. 
 158. Id. at 211–12. 
 159. Id. at 216. 
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selflessness of UPS union members across the country, as full-time 
workers stood with their colleagues not over an issue central to their 
own work-life, but to demand that UPS improve the lives of part 
timers by converting them to full time.160 With the strike fund nearly 
empty and facing one of the largest and most profitable employers in 
the country, business analysts predicted the union’s collapse.161 
Yet an already united and activist workforce schooled in the 
fundamentals of relational organizing uniquely prepared the union.162 
As the New York Times reported, “By the time the July 31 strike 
deadline approached, the teamsters had turned their UPS 
membership into a Juggernaut that the company’s executives 
underestimated.”163 Indeed, 95 percent of the workers voted to strike, 
and only a few thousand workers crossed the picket lines.164 The result 
was a resounding labor triumph, the first in many years.165 UPS agreed 
to transform ten thousand part-time jobs into full-time positions, to 
raise part-time starting pay for the first time in fifteen years, and to 
discard a major pension change the union had strongly opposed.166 In 
return, the union acceded only to the company’s desire for a five-year 
collective bargaining agreement.167 
For the UPS Teamsters, an ingrained practice of member 
activism, cultivating a tradition of cooperation and cohesion shaped 
 
 160. See id. at 217 (“Drivers and package handlers struck in part to demand that UPS 
convert more part-time jobs to full time.”). 
 161. See NATHAN NEWMAN, CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. RESEARCH, WHY VICTORY AT UPS 
MATTERS (1997), http://www.nathannewman.org/other/why_ups_strike_matters.html. (“So this 
is the situation Carey faced in this strike: an empty strike fund, his own leadership under a 
cloud, and facing one of the largest employers in the country backed by flush bank accounts 
and . . . $1 billion in profits the year before. Before the strike started, there were a number of 
pundit analyses that the Teamsters were doomed if they went on strike since their internal 
collapse or financial exhaustion of their strike fund would quickly kill them off.”). 
 162. See Steven Greenhouse, Yearlong Effort Key to Success for Teamsters, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 1997, at A1 (“Though it was four months before their contract expired, four months 
before a strike deadline, these workers in Saddle Brook, like those at rallies in 30 other cities 
around the country that morning, were already gung-ho volunteers in the teamsters’ efforts to 
mobilize members to stand up to U.P.S. . . . The teamsters’ yearlong mobilization included 
scores of rallies at U.P.S. sites as well as other major efforts, like sending questionnaires to 
185,000 teamsters asking what they wanted from the U.P.S. negotiations and collecting 100,000 
signatures backing the union’s demands. But the union did not neglect minor details: at one 
point, it distributed 50,000 whistles for use at the rallies.”). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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the union into a formidable collective force. Fundamentally, however, 
an established union is a bureaucracy, and it is reasonable to question 
if a constant undercurrent of collective activism is possible or even 
desirable in such a setting.168 
D. The Possibility of Sustained Internal Activism 
Sustained internal union activism is possible. As Linda 
Markowitz notes at the conclusion of her study, activism within a 
bureaucracy requires skills different from those applicable to a 
strategic social movement.169 Thus, activists must be taught not only 
how to win a campaign, but how to properly orient a union to 
seamlessly transfer energies to more bureaucratic yet equally critical 
tasks.170 
For unions, proper orientation embodies two components. First, 
face-to-face interaction must be conceived not as a burdensome 
administrative task or just another union picnic, but as a continuing 
opportunity for relationship renewal and member activation. 
Sociologist Steven Lopez, for instance, describes a union’s successful 
efforts to survive after a company had unilaterally suspended dues 
deductions: 
If dues could not be collected, the union would appear in an 
important sense to have ceased to exist. But instead of lamenting the 
lack of dues deduction, the union viewed collecting dues one on one 
as an opportunity for continuing the face-to-face interaction that 
kept it together during the darkest days of the [initial organizing] 
struggle.171 
Second, an incessant current of activism requires a constant 
simmering of minor conflict. Having examined the interaction 
between union culture and worker mobilization, sociologist Rick 
Fantasia notes that “cultures of solidarity are formed out of friction 
 
 168. See SULTAN, supra note 133, at 119 (“[T]he union begins as a protest movement. There 
is excitement and drama as the union strives for membership and recognition. The interest and 
participation of members are high, as each new member knows he can help determine the 
character and destiny of the organization. But over time, grass-roots participation diminishes, 
and union meetings lose their early New England town-meeting characteristics. Once the 
union’s survival is no longer in serious doubt, once it is recognized as a permanent institution in 
the plant, the stimulus for participation in the day-to-day affairs of the union decreases.”). 
 169. MARKOWITZ, supra note 116, at 162. 
 170. Id. 
 171. LOPEZ, supra note 90, at 193. 
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and opposition itself. That is, solidarity is to a considerable degree 
formed and intensified in interaction with the opposition.”172 Fantasia 
does not promote unbridled or open antagonism. Rather, he hints at a 
crucial element of sustained union vigor: the urgent awareness that 
the workplace, left unchecked, naturally tends against workers’ 
safety, rights, and freedom.173 In turn, a union bureaucracy that 
enables activism ensures that workers both identify employer 
coercion and understand that struggles do not cease with certification 
and a contract.174 Lopez, for instance, describes a union that 
established a twenty-four-hour hotline for workers to report unfair 
labor practices or Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
violations.175 Once union leaders encouraged the hotline’s use, the 
system ensured that the employer’s potential to infringe rights 
remained central in workers’ minds,176 promoting an everyday friction 
that Fantasia would argue stokes solidarity and action. 
The right-to-work environment may produce a similar effect. As 
right-to-work pressures union officials to dramatize the services they 
provide to justify dues,177 the officials may implicitly (or explicitly) 
project an “us-versus-them” oppositional framework. Workers, in 
turn, may slowly internalize this mentality, cementing an atmosphere 
of slight but omnipresent tension. 
More critically, right-to-work begs a perpetual, internal question 
for union members: “Why pay dues?” Although the answer to this 
question is important, the act of answering is more so; participation in 
the “community of reason-givers” begins when a union official crafts 
 
 172. RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY 233 (1988) (emphasis omitted). 
 173. See id. at 232 (“[T]he forms of collective action by workers were to a significant degree 
shaped and influenced by the structures and practices of institutional life that dominate labor 
relations in American society. The issues over which workers sometimes risked their livelihood 
were not drawn from an abstract ideological agenda but were things they felt they could 
reasonably achieve, based on the rights that were codified in, or closely related to, those 
bureaucratic structures and practices. . . . In the process, workers then engaged in new forms of 
activity (militant, direct action), created new associational bonds in practical forms (essentially 
emergent social movements), and developed new-found values of mutual solidarity (a new sense 
of ‘us,’ a new sense of ‘them,’ . . .).”). 
 174. See LOPEZ, supra note 90, at 193 (“The first task of continuing internal mobilization 
and organization was to convey to the rank and file . . . that the struggle was continuing, that 
there was important work for them to do.”). 
 175. Id. at 194. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See SULTAN, supra note 133, at 124 (“Right-to-work legislation undoubtedly imposes 
pressures on union leadership to dramatize the ‘service’ performed by the union. This process in 
turn encourages aggressive union behavior.”). 
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a thoughtful, reasoned response. The question arising again and again 
among many actors sustains the community. This repetitive back-and-
forth exchange, Stout and other radical democrats would assert, is the 
very engine of mobilization. 
E. The Desirability of Sustained Internal Activism 
A sustained current of intraunion activism is not just possible, it 
is also desirable. This Note has already recounted some historical, 
theoretical, and narrative evidence in support of that desirability, but 
a broader explanation remains, one that suggests an exotic, infectious 
quality of collective action. The experience of collective action 
stimulates and transforms workers. As Fantasia maintains, “[I]n 
collective action . . . something new is created . . . . An emergent 
culture is created in which new values are incubated, new forms of 
activity generated, and an associational bond of a new type 
formed.”178 
This phenomenon is apparent in Fantasia’s anatomy of two 
wildcat strikes at a small New Jersey iron foundry, Taylor Casting, in 
the mid-1970s.179 Using a meticulously catalogued first-person 
narrative, Fantasia shows how the shape of the second strike was 
largely “a function of the process manifested in the first.”180 That is, in 
the later strike workers appeared not only to have learned from the 
first action, but some were concretely transformed by it.181 Indeed, 
Fantasia details how workers in the second strike did not commit to 
solidarity spontaneously, as in the first strike.182 Rather, the day 
before the action occurred, workers secured tentative solidarity 
commitments from colleagues in areas of the factory not directly 
affected by the primary grievance and coordinated their dress on the 
morning of the second strike.183 Fantasia cites these differences as 
evidence of maturing collective tactics gained through experience.184 
Moreover, new union leaders emerged and solidarity was achieved 
 
 178. FANTASIA, supra note 172, at 174. 
 179. Id. at ix, 75. 
 180. Id. at 100. 
 181. See id. (“The dynamic shifted as workers came together and as company tactics 
changed in light of emergent (and expanded) expressions of solidarity.”). 
 182. Id. at 99–100. 
 183. Id. at 100. 
 184. See id. (“Essentially, it seems that solidarity and successful collective action in the later 
strike were made easier by what the men had learned from the success (and drama) of the 
first.”). 
03__OSWALT.DOC 12/20/2007  10:10:53 AM 
722 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:691 
more quickly in the second strike.185 The four workers who catalyzed 
the second action enthusiastically participated in the first strike, but 
were not instigators; by January, however, they were ready to 
embrace leadership roles.186 Fantasia hints at the deep relational 
implications of this transformative experience: 
Two of them worked closely together on a daily basis (as 
inspectors), but the other two (a welder and a heat-treatment 
furnace operator) worked at opposite ends of the department and 
had previously had little contact with each other . . . . Race and 
ethnicity were not binding elements; two of the workers were black, 
one white, and the other Hispanic.187 
Fantasia’s analysis of the two strikes adds credence to the 
hypothesis that shop-floor relational banter, embedded in the Taylor 
Casting employment experience as workers interacted with one 
another constantly throughout the day, can lead to incipient 
solidarity.188 At Taylor, this solidarity translated to overt activism on 
two otherwise ordinary mornings. Through an organic process of 
interrelation, an ad hoc leadership hierarchy took shape, and activist 
energy swelled among the broader workforce. 
Of course, relational organizing at Taylor Casting should not 
have arisen organically; it should not have been merely a fortuitous 
byproduct of workers’ arrangement on the factory floor. Union 
leadership should have planned, practiced, and promoted it. Instead, 
though effective, the strikes at Taylor highlighted a drastic disconnect 
between the union’s formal and informal leadership,189 a ripe target 
for future exploitation by management. The strikes were also illegal.190 
 
 185. Id. at 99–100. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 100–01. 
 188. See id. at 92 (“[T]he conditions of work and the day-to-day social interaction they 
shaped created at least a surface level of mutuality, a foundation of trust among the workers.”). 
 189. See id. (“The wildcat strike brought into sharp focus the day-to-day relationship 
between rank-and-file workers and the union leadership.”). 
 190. In both strikes a minority of the bargaining unit stopped working without prior 
knowledge or authorization from their majority representatives. Id. at 89, 96–97. Minority 
strikes are not protected by the Act. 2 ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1487 (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgins Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2001). In 
both strikes workers also remained on the employer’s property during the strike. FANTASIA, 
supra note 172, at 88, 97. This was also likely unprotected by the Act. ABA SECTION OF LABOR 
& EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra, at 1486; see NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgicial Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 
255–57 (1939) (“Here the strike was illegal in its inception and prosecution. . . . It was an illegal 
seizure of the building . . . .”). 
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Alternatively, had the official union leadership been committed 
to internal relational organizing in the months and years prior to the 
first wildcat, solidarity and energy would have still resulted, but it 
could have been harnessed strategically toward methodic collectivism, 
practiced within the bounds of the collective bargaining agreement. 
This Note demonstrates that the introduction of nationalized right-to-
work, combined with a union movement primed to take advantage of 
what the right-to-work environment requires relationally for unions to 
thrive, might institutionalize this scenario. When right-to-work is 
viewed not as a bureaucratic albatross but as an opportunity for 
intentional relational commitments, the resulting practices double as 
intensive preparation for future collective actions. 
CONCLUSION 
The “grand bargain” cannot be separated from its two 
underlying idealisms. First, workers who want to form a union 
community should not have to weigh incredible odds, a bulwark of 
legal impediments, and the possibility of personal financial 
destruction before they even begin. Second, true community leaves 
no room for involuntary members. 
But in states with union security, labor law facilitates the reverse: 
the campaign is hellish, and later, membership is guaranteed. And in 
right-to-work states, labor law is simply punitive: the campaign is 
hellish, and later, membership may evaporate. 
The grand bargain of this Note reworks both scenarios, 
presuming that the toughest union work should be reserved not for 
the beginning of a campaign, but after its conclusion. Prior to 
recognition, a worker should face a single choice, unfettered and 
without anxiety: “To sign or not to sign?” After recognition, a worker 
should face hundreds of difficult choices: “How on earth am I going 
to arrange all of these relational meetings?” In Beloved Community, 
Professor Charles Marsh denotes this latter struggle—which also 
confronted the civil rights movement—as the “more difficult work” of 
sustaining that follows the merely “difficult work”191 of creating: “the 
daily disciplines and sacrifices required to sustain beloved 
community. . . . begin[] . . . in a whole lot of waiting around for car 
 
 191. See CHARLES MARSH, THE BELOVED COMMUNITY 5 (2005) (“The new legions of 
Christian radicals working in rural and urban areas remind us of the sobering fact that beyond 
the difficult work of achieving legal equality awaits more difficult work . . . .”). 
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rides, in tedious organizational meetings and arguments about 
strategy, around the mimeograph machine.”192 
A union’s “more difficult work” encompasses Marsh’s talk of 
carpooling and copying, but also the ribaldry of a buzzing union hall 
and its constituent parts: the scribbled events calendar, the old 
confetti lodged in a matted carpet that could use a good steam 
cleaning, the concrete walls adorned with memories of events and 
people past, and the ever-evolving phone tree.193 Through it all, the 
essence of union community is revealed. 
Of course, such “work” does not come naturally to all unions. 
Just as Stout believes accountable relationships can cure a political 
culture that cultivates bad democrats,194 so too might they cure a 
union culture that cultivates bad unionists. When properly conceived, 
a prime incubator for such relationships may be the right-to-work 
environment. Proving that has been the primary challenge of this 
Note. 
Rick Fantasia’s conclusion that “the character of the labor 
movement in the United States [is] . . . crucial in determining much of 
the shape and content of collective actions by workers”195 is not 
rhetorical filling. It is a challenge, one that summons a slew of simple 
diagnostic questions: How many relational meetings are automatically 
scheduled for new hires? Which and how many committees are they 
expected to join? What are their responsibilities in the union hall? If 
the union across town strikes, how many extra meals should be 
prepared for the strikers’ families? 
Organized workers can pursue better wages, better benefits, 
more fairness, and more dignity. But to be actually effective as a 
union, they must pursue an internal, relational community. These 
questions simply point to some natural expectations of a functioning 
relational community. In such an environment, that workers could 
 
 192. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 193. See FANTASIA, supra note 172, at 243–44 (“The union presence at the local level must 
be experienced as more than a bureaucratic labyrinth through which grievances are channeled; 
the union hall should be a rich center of cultural life and education that cultivates traditions and 
practices of solidarity.”). 
 194. See STOUT, supra note 138, at 303–04 (“The kind of community that democrats should 
be promoting . . . involves shared commitment to the Constitution and the culture of 
democracy. . . . [I]ts central and definitive component is the discursive practice of holding one 
another responsible for the actions we commit, the commitments we undertake, and the sorts of 
people we become.”). 
 195. FANTASIA, supra note 172, at 239. 
03__OSWALT.DOC 12/20/2007  10:10:53 AM 
2007] LABOR RELATIONS 725 
technically “opt out” of the community is not a relevant 
consideration. They will have as many reasons as relationships not to. 
